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Tax competition theory predicts that the introduction of the EU Single Market in 1993 should have
caused excise tax competition and thus increased strategic interaction in the setting of excise taxes
among EU countries. We test this prediction using a panel data set of 12 EU countries over the
period 1987–2004. We find that for excise duties on still and sparkling wine, beer and ethyl alcohol,
strategic interaction significantly increased after 1993. There is weaker evidence of increased inter-
action in cigarette taxes, possibly because cigarettes are widely smuggled, giving rise to tax competi-
tion even before the Single Market.
The Single European Act, which came into force in July 1987, initiated a vast legis-
lative programme involving the adoption of hundreds of directives and regulations,
which gradually established the single market amongst EU member states over a
period up to the end of 1992. Two of the most important provisions of the single
market were: first, to allow individuals to import relatively large quantities of goods
purchased abroad, which had previously been subject to the importing country’s rate
of tax and, second, the abolition of physical border controls, which were replaced by
random spot checks.
Before 1 January 1993, all imports by EU residents from other EU countries were
essentially subject to destination-based taxation i.e. taxation at the rate of excise and
VAT of the country to which the good was imported.1 But, since 1 January 1993, all
imports by EU residents from other EU countries were subject to origin-based taxation.
Specifically, there are no restrictions on such imports, except
(i) that tax must have been paid in the country of purchase of the good and
(ii) that goods are not for resale.
Condition (ii) is enforced by generous upper limits, plus random customs checks at
borders. For example, according to the UK Customs and Excise, if you bring back large
quantities of alcohol or tobacco, a Customs Officer is more likely to ask about the
purposes for which you hold the goods. This will most likely be the case if you appear at
the airport with more than: 3,200 cigarettes, 400 cigarillos, 200 cigars, 3kg of smoking
tobacco, 110 litres of beer, 10 litres of spirits, 90 litres of wine, 20 litres of fortified wine
i.e.: port or sherry. The above allowance is more than enough for the annual con-
sumption of the average two-adult household. Moreover, imports in excess of these
levels do not automatically trigger fines or prosecution: the levels are indicative only,
and the onus is on Customs officials to prove smuggling.
* We thank Paul Elhorst, Paulo Parente, two anonymous referees, the editor, the seminar participants at
the 2008 RES conference in Warwick, at the 2007 summer school on Tax Competition at Institut d’Economia
de Barcelona, for helpful comments and discussions and we are grateful to the Office of Taxation and
Customs of the European Commission for useful advice.
1 A minor qualification is that small quantities of excisable products could be bought at duty-free shops in
airports, on boats, etc., without any tax payable. But, the amounts involved are quite small.
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These changes in the rules create incentives both for legitimate tax-induced cross-
border shopping and for smuggling. There is evidence that both these activities are
occurring on a large scale at some borders. For example, the rates of excise duty on
alcoholic drinks and tobacco products in the UK are significantly higher than those in
most other EU Member States, especially France. The UK tax authority (HMRC, 2002)
estimates that 2001/2: 7% of all cigarettes consumed in the UK were cross-border
shopped, and 21% illegally smuggled, implying a tax revenue loss of £3.6 billion to the
UK Treasury, 7% of all wine consumed in the UK was cross-border shopped and 2%
illegally smuggled, implying a tax revenue loss of over £250 million, and 1% of all beer
consumed in the UK was cross-border shopped and 4% smuggled, mostly by cross-
channel passenger smuggling, implying a loss of also over £250 million.
What is less clear is whether these changes, and the subsequent excise revenue losses
in high-tax countries, have caused tax competition between EU member states to occur
or intensify. Certainly, the theory (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Lockwood, 1993; Ohsawa,
1999; Nielsen, 2001) suggest that this should happen. As just observed, the Single
Market resulted in a switch from destination- to origin-based taxation of cross-border
transactions by individuals. These models predict that tax competition only occurs with
origin-based taxation. So, the models predict, unambiguously and generally, that we
should observe competition in excise taxes between EU countries only after 1993.2
It is important to test this prediction, not least because of widespread concern on the
part of policy makers, perhaps motivated by the theory, about the single market and tax
competition. For example, it is well documented that fear of excise tax competition
after the completion of the single market caused the European Commission to push for
minimum excise taxes in the late 1980s; these minima were actually introduced in
1993.3 This article represents the first attempt, to our knowledge, to do this directly.
Of course, strategic interaction can occur for other reasons e.g. yardstick competi-
tion, or common intellectual trends. So, the observable implication of the theory is that
strategic interaction between EU countries in the setting of excise taxes should
intensify after 1993. How much it intensifies depends on the scale of cross-border
shopping and potential revenue losses from high taxes: as the above discussion indic-
ates, these might be quite large. The key idea of the article is that completion of the
single market can be interpreted as a kind of natural experiment that allows us to
separate the effects of tax competition from other forms of strategic interaction.
We employ a balanced panel data set of 12 EU countries over the period 1987–2004,
which has excise taxes on five commodities: still wine, sparking wine, beer, products
made from ethyl alcohol, i.e. spirits, and cigarettes. The excise tax data were taken from
the European Commission’s Excise Duty Tables and Inventory of Taxes. Using this data
[ M A R C H 2009] 407E V I D E N C E F R O M E U C O U N T R I E S
2 A possible counter-argument concerns diversion fraud i.e. diversion of goods in bonded warehouses
destined for export to the domestic market, where they are illegally sold without payment of excise taxes. This
activity has become easier since the advent of the single market. Diversion fraud can only be limited by cutting
tax rates and so the incentives to cut rates, independently of what other countries do, may have increased
since 1993. This is a force that might actually weaken tax competition since 1993 (we are indebted to a referee
for this point).
3 The prospect of tax-cutting has thus become a principal concern in discussions of indirect tax policy . . .
Approximation is one obvious response . . . the original approximation proposals were replaced by a more
pragmatic approach (of) a minimum standard rate of VAT of 15 per cent . . . (and) minimum excise rates.
(Keen, 1993, p. 26).
 The Author(s). Journal compilation  Royal Economic Society 2009
set, we estimate an empirical model where the excise tax in a given country depends
linearly on the weighted average of other countries taxes and a set of control variables.
Following the literature, we assume that the weights are contiguity weights; that is,
country i reacts to j’s tax only if they have a common border. This is a very plausible
assumption to make, as cross-border shopping typically occurs between immediate
geographical neighbours.4
We test for structural breaks in reaction functions around 1993 in two ways. First, in
order to conserve degrees of freedom, given the relatively small size of the sample, we
only allow the slope of the tax reaction function to vary before and after 1993, imposing
equality on all the other coefficients. We call this specification a tax-specific structural
break. Then, we allow for a completely general structural break, estimating the tax reaction
functions separately on sub-samples before and after 1993.
For both specifications, we find robust evidence that for all product groups except
cigarettes, the degree of strategic interaction has increased since 1993. For the baseline
tax-specific structural break model, the slope of the tax reaction function is insignific-
antly different from zero prior to 1993 for wine, beer or alcohol taxes, but it is always
significantly positive after 1993. A 1 euro increase in a tax on one of these product
groups by all other countries causes a typical country in the sample to raise its own tax
by about 0.2–0.28 euro. For the general structural break model, the findings are sim-
ilar. The slope of the tax reaction function is always insignificantly different from zero
prior to 1993 for wine, beer or alcohol taxes, but it is always significantly positive after
1993. Moreover, we can always reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients in
the two regressions.
Thus one could go further and say that for these four products, there is evidence,
consistent with the theory, that the single market, by creating incentives for cross-
border shopping, caused strategic interaction between countries in the form of tax
competition.
The situation for cigarette taxes, is however, rather different. As explained in more
detail below, overall, there is much weaker evidence that tax competition intensified
with the single market in the case of cigarettes.5 One possible explanation for this
difference is that, as remarked above, the amount of illegal smuggling relative to cross-
border shopping is much larger for cigarettes than it is for the other products. So, it is
possible that governments of the countries in our sample took account of how their
neighbours were taxing cigarettes even before 1993 for this reason.6
In Section 4, we discuss the robustness of our findings to various changes in the
empirical specification of the model. We consider the effect of dropping country
controls in the general structural break model, because they seem to be imprecisely
estimated in the period 1987–2002, due to the small number of observations. Our
results are robust to this change. We also experiment with different weighting schemes,
and measuring the taxes in national currency, rather than euros.
4 The robustness of the results with respect to other weights are tested in Section 4.2.
5 Specifically, for both model specifications, and for both the specific component of the tax and the total
tax, there is evidence of significant strategic interaction prior to 1993.
6 Smuggling creates incentives for tax competition even if legal transactions are subject to destination-
based taxes, because smugglers have incentives to transport goods illegally to where taxes, and thus prices, are
high.
408 [ M A R C HT H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L
 The Author(s). Journal compilation  Royal Economic Society 2009
Finally, we also investigate the impact of minimum tax rates, also introduced in 1993,
on strategic interaction. Unfortunately, as explained in Section 4.3, the theory does not
have any robust predictions about how a minimum tax will affect tax reaction functions.
Also, because we split the sample in 1993, we can only consider minimum taxes that
change in real terms after 1993. Only two such minima meet this criterion, the min-
imum taxes on beer and ethyl alcohol.7 An increase in both of these minima have a
significantly positive effect on the amount of strategic interaction.
The related literature is as follows. First, there is a small empirical literature on
spatial interactions in excise taxes in the US (Nelson, 2002; Rork, 2003; Devereux
et al., 2007). But in the US, there has been no natural experiment similar to the
completion of the single market in the EU in recent times. Within the US, transac-
tions by individuals of excisable commodities that cross state borders are essentially
unrestricted, meaning that the origin regime is firmly in place for these kinds of
transactions.8
There are also a couple of cross-country empirical studies of strategic interaction
in commodity taxes (Egger et al. 2005; Evers et al. 2004). Egger et al. (2005) test
some of the predictions of Ohsawa’s theoretical model of commodity tax competi-
tion on commodity tax data for a panel of 22 OECD countries. But, unlike our
study, they use an aggregate indicator of commodity taxation taken from national
accounts data, which, relative to our article, obviously has the disadvantage that it
does not measure the setting of individual tax instruments by governments very
precisely.
The article by Evers et al. (2004), in contrast, studies strategic interaction in the
setting of diesel excises in EU countries, plus Norway and Switzerland, and so is
closest to our article. But, almost by definition, the treatment of imports of fuel in
the tank of a vehicle must be on an origin basis9 and so completion of the single
market has no predicted effect on the setting of this excise, except possibly through
the introduction of a minimum EU excise; the latter effect is the focus of Evers
et al. (2004).
Finally, Crawford et al. (1999) study a related issue; whether the elasticity of demand
for beer, wines and spirits has increased in the UK since the advent of the single
market. They reject the hypothesis that elasticities have increased, which is somewhat
surprising given the very large scale of cross-border shopping for these goods in France.
In any case, this does not directly contradict our findings, as tax competition could be
driven by the belief on the part of governments that elasticity of the domestic tax base
has increased, whether or not it has in reality.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section 1, we explain our econo-
metric method and estimation procedure. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 the
results and Section 4 some robustness checks. Section 5 provides concluding comments.
7 The minimum tax on wine (still or sparkling) is zero, and on cigarettes, the minimum is expressed as a
percentage of the retail price, which has not changed since its introduction.
8 The borderline of legality in the case of cigarettes is provided by the Contraband Cigarette Act of 1978,
which prohibits single shipments, sale or purchase of more than 60,000 cigarettes not bearing the tax stamp
of the state in which they are found.
9 That is, even with border controls, customs officials have no way of knowing where the fuel in the tank of
a vehicle has been bought.
2009] 409E V I D E N C E F R O M E U C O U N T R I E S
 The Author(s). Journal compilation  Royal Economic Society 2009
1. The Econometric Model
In the theoretical model first presented by Kanbur and Keen (1993) and developed by
Ohsawa (1999) and Nielsen (2001) amongst others, origin-based commodity taxation
generates positively sloped tax reaction functions between a set of countries.10 That is,
under the assumptions made in those papers, in country i ¼ 1,. . .,n, the excise tax, si, is
an increasing, piecewise linear, function of the tax rate in the other countries, sj, j 6¼ i.
Moreover, under realistic assumptions,11 the response of si to sj will be non-zero only if
i and j are contiguous, i.e. share a common border. Finally, this response will depend
on the length of the border between i and j and also on the population sizes in the two
countries (Ohsawa, 1999; Devereux et al., 2007).
Our empirical specification is therefore the following:
sit ¼ fi þ
X
j 6¼i
aijsjt þ d0zit þ it ð1Þ
where i ¼ 1,. . .,n denotes a country, t ¼ 1,. . .,T a time-period, fi a country fixed effect,
zit a k  1 vector of relevant characteristics of country i at time t, d a k  1 vector of
coefficients and, finally, aij are coefficients measuring how si responds to sj. However,
this cannot be estimated as it stands, as there are too many parameters aij to be
estimated. The usual approach is define aij ¼ bxij and thus to modify (1) as:




where the xij are exogenously chosen weights that aggregate the tax rates in other
countries into a single variable si,t, which has coefficient b. The xij are usually
normalised so that
P
j 6¼i xij ¼ 1. This is a widely used procedure and there is
considerable discussion of the appropriate weights in the literature, e.g., Brueckner
(2003).
Our key theoretical hypothesis is that b is higher when the Single Market regime is in
place. In fact, if only tax competition and no other form of strategic interaction is
present, we expect b ¼ 0 before 1993. We test for this dependence in two ways. First, we
allow for a change only in the reaction function slope coefficient b after 1993, assuming
that all other coefficients remain unchanged. That is, we estimate
sit ¼ fi þ bsi;t þ cðDt  si;tÞ þ d0zit þ it ð3Þ
where Dt ¼ 1 if t 1993 and Dt ¼ 0 otherwise. The theory thus predicts that c > 0. This
has the advantage of being a relatively parsimonious specification, with only b,c and
coefficients on five exogenous covariates to be estimated.12 This is important because
of the relatively small size of the panel; we only have 204 observations. We call this the
tax-specific structural break specification.
10 Piecewise linear reaction functions are generated by the assumption that the population is uniformly
distributed within each country. If the density of the population is the same within each country, then the
reaction functions are just linear.
11 That is, that prices are such that consumers do not wish to drive though a third country to buy in a low-
tax country.
12 We estimate (3) using the within transformation (Wooldridge, 2002), so the time demeaning of (3)
removes the country-specific effect fi.
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We test the robustness of the tax-specific structural break specification by allowing
for a more general structural break; that is, by estimating (2) separately on sub-samples
1987–92 and 1993–2004. Let the estimates of b on the earlier and later sub-samples be
b1,b2 respectively. So, our basic hypothesis is that b2 > b1. Note also that with this
specification we effectively allow the intercept of the reaction functions (2) to shift after
1993. We call this the general structural break specification. This specification is more
demanding of the data, as then in the earlier period, six parameters b,d are to be
estimated from only 60 observations.
The system (2) is known as a spatial autoregressive model (SAR). OLS estimation of a
SAR model is inappropriate, because the right-hand side variables sjt, j 6¼ i are endo-
genous. We estimate this system by instrumental variables. In the case of the general
structural break model, at the first stage, the endogenous variable si,t is instrumented
by the weighted averages of the controls i.e. zci;t ¼
P
j 6¼i xij z
c
jt , for control c ¼ 1,..k. In
the case of the tax-specific structural break model, there are two endogenous variables,
si,t and Dt  si,t, and these are instrumented by zci;t , and Dt  zci;t . So, our main-
tained hypothesis is that in country, the controls are exogenous to the setting of excise
taxes on tobacco and alcohol products; given our list of controls in Table 1 below, this
seems reasonable.
Finally, we turn to the specification of the weighting matrix. Following the theoretical
literature and several empirical studies, our baseline weighting matrix uses contiguity
weights. These weights capture the idea that with cross-border shopping, tax bases are
typically mobile only between geographically neighbouring countries and so govern-
ments are likely to react only to what their geographical neighbours do. Specifically, we







Still wine* 49.222 77.858 18.094 78.899
Sparkling wine* 107.711 139.652 29.825 142.147
Beery 2.095 2.207 0.539 2.230
Ethyl alcohol‡ 1299.449 814.965 375.130 753.811
Cigarettes spec§ 29.574 34.595 16.355 31.763
Cigarettes tot{ 64.566 11.195 9.754 5.724
Controls
Poptot 292.126 268.515 6.899 279.674
Govcons 19.864 3.295 0.991 3.274
Govright 0.436 0.497 0.461 0.191
Govleft 0.274 0.447 0.326 0.318
*euro per h1 of product not exceeding 12% of alcohol.
yeuro per h1/degree Plato, alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 0.5%.
‡euro per h1 of pure alcohol.
§euro per 1000 cigarettes.
{% retail price.
Euro converted from national currency, before 01/01/1999 ECU.
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xij ¼ 1=ni if j 2 Ni0 if j =2Ni

ð4Þ
where Ni is the set of states that border state i, and ni ¼ #Ni. This assigns equal weight to
all countries on the border of country i, and weight zero to the other countries. The
matrix is normalised to have rows summing to one.
One problem in implementing (4) is that it is difficult to define neighbours when a
country is an island, or part of an island, or has no direct EU neighbours. These
problems arise for three of the eight countries in our data-set: UK, Ireland and Greece.
A strict imposition of contiguity weights for the UK, for example, would give only
Ireland as the neighbour for the UK and vice versa. This is inaccurate, because it does
not account for the considerable tax-induced cross-border shopping between the UK
and France. Our solution is to say that if i is an island, a positive contiguity weight was
given to country j when j could be directly reached from country i by crossing only over
water, i.e. without passing through a third country.13 In Section 4.2, we consider the
robustness of our results to alternative weighting schemes.
2. Data
We construct a balanced panel of data from 12 EU countries over 17 years, 1987
and 1989–2004 inclusive. We consider only the countries which were members of
the EU in 1987, excluding those that joined the EU later on. Data are not available
for the year 1988, so there are 204 observations. Data on excises are based on the
Excise Duty Table issued by the European Commission, cross-checked against the
available issues of the Inventory of Taxes (only available for 1994, 1999, 2002). In
the case of a discrepancies, which were not many, we took the data from the
Inventory of Taxes as being authoritative, as these data are directly supplied by the
member countries.
We study taxes on five kinds of products: still wine, sparkling wine, beer, cigarettes
and ethyl alcohol, the last being effectively an excise tax on spirits, such as whisky,
brandy etc.14 All of these products, except for cigarettes, are only subject to a specific
excise tax, i.e. levied per unit of physical quantity. Where there are several rates of tax,
e.g., standard and reduced rates, we use only the standard rates. The physical units in
which the goods are measured are indicated in Table 1.
In the case of cigarettes, all countries also levy an ad valorem excise tax. Moreover,
depending on the country, either the specific or ad valorem component of the tax can
be the more important one and so we cannot safely ignore either. We do not have data
separately on the retail price of cigarettes, so we are constrained by data in the Excise
Duty Tables. These report both the specific tax and the total tax (specific, ad valorem
and VAT) as a percentage of the retail price. We use both these tax measures.
13 For example, the UK has only Ireland as a land neighbour but we assume also that Belgium, France and
Netherlands are neighbours, as they can be directly reached crossing the Channel. For Ireland, due to its
distance from continental Europe, we assume the UK as the only neighbour. Greece does not have any EU
land neighbour and so Italy is its only neighbour by this criterion.
14 In the case of beer, there were two kinds of physical unit used in the Excise Duty Tables: degree Plato
and degree of alcohol by volume. According to Directive 92/84/EEC it has been accepted that a tax of 0.748
euro Plato is equal to a tax of 1.87 euro alcohol by volume so we applied this conversion factor.
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In Figures A.1–A.5 in the Appendix, we report for each of the five goods the time
series plot of the tax rates in national currency, unadjusted for inflation. Some general
features can be identified. First, as might be expected, countries generally adjust their
taxes upwards, in response to general price inflation. Second, there are some excep-
tions, associated with the start of the single market in 1993. For example, both Den-
mark and Luxembourg cut their tax on wine (still and sparkling) by large amounts in
1992, in the case of Luxembourg to zero. Again, Denmark cut its tax on beer, and
Germany and Luxembourg raised their tax on beer, both by large amounts, in 1992.
When we run the regressions, we make two changes to the dependent variable. First,
we adjust for inflation by dividing through by the RPI for the relevant country, with
2000 as the base year, because rational governments will be concerned with the real,
rather than nominal, value of the taxes they set. Perhaps for this reason, we did not find
any evidence of strategic interaction when we used nominal taxes. Second, we find that
our regressions work a little better when the dependent variable is converted to euros,15
possibly because countries are comparing their own taxes to others in different
national currencies and can only do so in a common currency.16
Table 1 gives some basic decomposition of the variance of both taxes and covariates
between country and within-country components. The taxes are in real terms, expressed
in euros. Note that while most of the variation is between countries, there is some
variation in taxes over time.17
Finally, in estimating the determinants of the taxes, we need to control for other
factors. We use a parsimonious set of controls that can be found in most of the existing
empirical literature on tax competition. First, we have the basic variables of GDP per
capita in local currency units and total population in hundreds of thousands of
inhabitants. We expect total population to increase the level of tax, as it is a robust
prediction of the theory that larger countries set higher taxes in the origin regime,
because they have a larger domestic tax base. (The GDP per capita variable is not
reported in Table 1, as it is not comparable across countries.) We also include
government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP as an indicator of
demand for tax revenue. All of these variables are taken from World Bank WDI.
We add two political 0–1 dummy variables for the ideological orientation of gov-
ernments. We used the Schmidt Index,18 included in the Comparative Political Data
Set 1960–2004 (Armingeon et al., 2006), to define a dummy for right-wing cabinets, a
dummy for stand-off between left and right cabinets, and a dummy for left-wing cab-
inets. The second dummy is used as the reference category in the estimation. The
descriptive statistics for the controls are also given in Table 1.
15 Before 1999, we converted national currencies to ECU using the exchange rates provided in the Excise
Duty Tables.
16 We tried the same regressions using the tax variables in real national currency. The results are broadly
similar and are not reported here to save space. The results are in Table 9 of Lockwood and Migali (2008).
17 Due to the way that Stata calculates the decomposition, the two components add up to more than the
total variance.
18 This is an index created by Schmidt (1996), which gives different weights according to the cabinet
composition. Schmidt-Index: (1) hegemony of right-wing parties (govleft ¼ 0), (2) dominance of right-wing
(and centre) parties (govleft < 33.3), (3) stand-off between left and right (33.3 < govleft < 66.6), (4) domi-
nance of social-democratic and other left parties (govleft > 66.6), (5) hegemony of social-democratic and
other left parties (govleft ¼ 100).
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3. Results
The results are given by commodity in Tables 2–4. All have the same format. Each
Table gives the results for a pair of taxes. The top panel gives regression coefficients. In
columns 1 and 4, the estimate of the baseline tax-specific structural break model (3) is
reported. The key coefficient of interest is the coefficient on D  si, i.e. just c in (3).
In columns 2 and 3, and in columns 5 and 6, the estimate of the general structural
break model is reported. For example, looking at columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, we see
that these report estimates of (2) for the specific tax on still wine for each of the two
sub-periods 1987–92, and 1993–2004 are separately.
The middle panel gives the number of observations, and two tests. The first is an
F-test for joint significance of the controls. The second is a test for the equality of
coefficients across the two sub-periods in the general structural break model.19
In the bottom panel of the Table, the following diagnostic statistics are also reported.
First, Pagan and Hall’s (1983) test is a test of heteroscedasticity for instrumental vari-
ables (IV) estimation. This statistic is distributed as chi-squared under the null of no
heteroscedasticity and under the maintained hypothesis that the error of the regression
is normally distributed. When we find heteroscedasticity we report the corrected
standard errors using a robust variance estimator.
Second, the FIV in the first stage of the estimation tests the null hypothesis that the
instruments are not correlated with the endogenous variable. A rejection means that
there is such a correlation. We can reject the null in all but three cases (the shorter
sample period 1987–92 for wine and beer). Note that as there are two endogenous
variables in the tax-specific structural break, there are two such tests, denoted FIV1, FIV2.
In the general structural break model, only FIV1 applies. Under the null hypothesis that
instruments are not correlated with the endogenous variable, FIV1 and FIV2 follow an F
distribution.20
Third, the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio tests whether the equa-
tion is identified.21 The statistic provides a measure of instrument relevance, and
rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified.
Fourth, the Hansen-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the
error term. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number
of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instru-
ments. Looking across all regressions in Tables 2–4, this test is passed at 5% in all but
one case (the tax-specific structural break model in the case of sparkling wine).
19 The test statistic is ðRSS  RSS1  RSS2Þ=6=ðRSS1 þ RSS2Þ=ð204  17  12Þ, where RSS, RSS1, RSS2 are
the residual sums of squares of the regressions on the full sub-sample and the first and second sub-samples
respectively. Under the null hypothesis of equality of all coefficients, this has a distribution F(K,NT  2K).
20 The degree of freedom of these tests depend on the set of instruments used and, in our estimation, we
do not always use the full set but the combination that passes the identification tests. In general, the F test is
distributed as F(L,N  K) where L ¼ number of instruments, N ¼ sample size (reduced by the number of
fixed effects, 12 in our case), K ¼ number of regressors including the instruments.
21 The null hypothesis of the test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank ¼ K  1, where
K ¼ number of regressors, i.e, that the equation is underidentified. Under the null of underidentification,
the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom ¼ (L  K þ 1), where L ¼ number of
instruments (included þ excluded).
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We now discuss the results by type of taxable product, beginning with still wine. In the
baseline model, we see that b, the coefficient on si, is insignificantly different from zero
but c, the coefficient on D  si, is significantly positive at 0.28. That is, there is evidence
of strategic interaction only after 1993. Specifically, an increase in the weighted average
of all other countries duties on wine by 1 euro increases country i’s excise by 0.28 euro.
Turning to the control variables, we see first that total population is significantly posit-
ive, a pattern that is repeated across other taxes. This is interesting because it confirms a
robust prediction of the theory that larger countries have higher taxes in the origin
regime, because they have a larger domestic tax base (Kanbur and Keen, 1993).
In the general structural break model, the key finding about increased strategic
interaction is replicated. Before 1993, b1, the coefficient on si, is insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero but, after 1993, it is significantly positive at 0.423. That is, an increase
in the weighted average of all other countries duties on wine by 1 euro increases
Table 2
Estimates for Wine Taxes
Still wine Sparkling wine
1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004
si 0.165 0.521 0.423*** 0.044 0.704 1.215***
(0.318) (1.458) (0.151) (0.417) (2.467) (0.323)
D  si 0.280** 0.206**
(0.131) (0.095)
Total population 0.461** 0.669 0.440* 0.961*** 1.839 0.023
(0.228) (0.588) (0.258) (0.312) (1.362) (0.226)
gdppc 0.037 0.043 0.005 0.137** 0.103 0.061
(0.023) (0.174) (0.015) (0.057) (1.021) (0.048)
govcons 2.066* 0.491 0.566 4.463* 0.504 4.509
(1.206) (2.751) (1.100) (2.467) (5.592) (3.161)
govright 3.048 7.046 1.413 4.861 15.431 7.076
(3.320) (5.944) (3.433) (6.075) (13.587) (8.238)
govleft 3.892 7.956 2.330 6.457 12.950 4.842
(4.128) (6.911) (4.430) (6.279) (16.250) (8.095)
N 204 60 144 204 60 144
F-test 4.010 0.515 3.124 7.136 0.917 4.319
(0.000) (0.794) (0.007) (0.000) (0.493) (0.001)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Pagan-H 80.656 7.693 72.984 78.595 6.212 39.825
(0.000) (0.989) (0.000) (0.000) (0.997) (0.003)
FIV1 4.625 1.120 3.774 7.454 0.262 4.823
(0.000) (0.352) (0.012) (0.000) (0.852) (0.003)
FIV2 9.017 18.508
(0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 26.146 3.518 14.902 34.408 0.919 18.156
(0.000) (0.318) (0.002) (0.000) (0.821) (0.000)
Hansen 6.669 0.059 0.207 11.452 0.162 0.201
(0.246) (0.971) (0.902) (0.043) (0.922) (0.904)
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in paranthesis under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as:
F(6,42) for 1987–92, F(6,126) for 1993–2004 and F(7,185) for 1987–2004.
Str. break: H0 ¼ no structural break.
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country i ’s excise by approximately 0.42 euro. There is some instability in the coeffi-
cients on the control variables, however; these are markedly different during the period
1987–92 from both the period 1993–2004 and the single estimate for the tax-specific
structural break model; the latter two are much closer to each other. This may indicate
overfitting for the regressions over the period 1987–92, where six coefficients are
estimated from just 60 observations. This pattern of markedly different coefficients for
the period 1987–92 appears right across the six taxes.
Turning now to the tax on sparkling wine, the same general pattern emerges. In the
baseline model, we see that b, the coefficient on si, is insignificantly different from zero
but c, the coefficient on D  si, is significantly positive at 0.206. That is, there is
evidence of strategic interaction only after 1993. Specifically, an increase in the weighted
average of all other countries duties on wine by 1 euro increases country i ’s excise by
approximately 0.21 euro. In the general structural break model, the key finding about
Table 3
Estimates for Beer and Ethyl Alcohol Taxes
Beer Ethyl Alcohol
1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004
si 0.130 0.215 0.309* 0.260 0.334 0.649**
(0.200) (0.456) (0.175) (0.496) (0.320) (0.257)
D  si 0.199** 0.261**
(0.084) (0.115)
Total population 0.021*** 0.016 0.021** 7.162 20.414** 1.673
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (4.913) (9.344) (2.619)
gdppc 0.003*** 0.003 0.000 2.294** 3.546 2.300*
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (1.008) (5.345) (1.287)
govcons 0.036 0.082 0.033 15.633 48.981 0.971
(0.035) (0.053) (0.035) (18.896) (31.459) (20.409)
govright 0.078 0.003 0.037 21.713 5.584 40.644
(0.111) (0.063) (0.108) (58.550) (55.096) (83.888)
govleft 0.002 0.045 0.016 57.364 139.213 180.054
(0.123) (0.139) (0.139) (85.777) (105.619) (113.589)
N 204 60 144 204 60 144
F-test 6.643 2.468 1.966 16.950 3.854 10.286
(0.000) (0.039) (0.075) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Pagan-H 74.158 17.019 66.545 105.660 36.206 79.249
(0.000) (0.652) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
FIV1 9.174 1.420 4.093 22.288 12.938 18.037
(0.000) (0.245) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FIV2 7.105 99.926
(0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 63.282 4.635 18.536 39.793 12.314 26.534
(0.000) (0.327) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Hansen 10.320 3.673 7.129 9.717 4.251 1.342
(0.112) (0.299) (0.068) (0.205) (0.119) (0.511)
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as:
F(6,42) for 1987–92, F(6,126) for 1993–2004 and F(7,185) for 1987–2004.
Str. break: H0 ¼ no structural break.
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increased strategic interaction is replicated. Before 1993, b1, the coefficient on si, is
insignificantly different from zero, but after 1993, b2 is significantly positive
22 at 1.215.
In Table 3, the same story is also apparent for the specific taxes on beer and ethyl
alcohol. For beer, in the baseline model, we see that b, the coefficient on si, is
insignificantly different from zero but c, the coefficient on D  si, is significantly
positive at 0.199. In the general structural break model, the key finding about increased
strategic interaction is again replicated. Before 1993, b1, the coefficient on si, is
insignificantly different from zero but, after 1993, b2 is significantly positive at 0.309.
For ethyl alcohol, in the baseline model, we see that b, the coefficient on si, is
insignificantly different from zero but c, the coefficient on D  si, is significantly
positive at 0.261. In the general structural break model, before 1993, b1 is insignific-
antly different from zero but, after 1993, b2 is significantly positive at 0.649.
Table 4
Estimates for Cigarettes Taxes
Cigarettes specific Cigarettes total
1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004
si 1.070*** 0.497*** 1.320*** 0.761*** 1.070*** 1.007***
(0.251) (0.182) (0.277) (0.128) (0.091) (0.058)
D  si 0.045 0.074**
(0.156) (0.031)
Total population 0.187 0.560*** 0.280 0.019 0.072 0.028
(0.169) (0.126) (0.320) (0.039) (0.180) (0.054)
gdppc 0.045** 0.035 0.079** 0.005 0.044* 0.004
(0.020) (0.033) (0.039) (0.004) (0.025) (0.007)
govcons 1.932* 0.726* 3.624** 0.256 0.242 0.815*
(1.020) (0.428) (1.593) (0.287) (0.675) (0.481)
govright 1.973 0.146 5.389 0.674 1.462 0.066
(2.722) (0.998) (4.079) (0.923) (2.209) (1.097)
govleft 0.613 1.293 6.941 0.755 1.075 2.003
(3.319) (1.298) (4.569) (1.211) (2.860) (1.256)
N 204 60 144 204 60 144
F-test 14.113 7.974 8.797 67.248 30.853 50.435
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Pagan-H 91.089 21.111 55.899 71.354 18.804 48.517
(0.000) (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.535) (0.000)
FIV1 5.911 11.525 2.817 89.266 33.204 17.360
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FIV2 8.220 292.137
(0.000) (0.000)
Anderson 40.331 13.785 13.338 34.398 19.995 38.892
(0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Hansen 13.684 0.378 4.511 6.384 5.928 2.637
(0.057) (0.945) (0.211) (0.172) (0.115) (0.451)
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as:
F(6,42) for 1987–92, F(6,126) for 1993–2004 and F(7,185) for 1987–2004.
Str. break: H0 ¼ no structural break.
22 It is worth noting that the usual models of excise tax competition under the origin principle generate
tax reaction functions with a slope of less than one, so this coefficient is not fully consistent with the theory.
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However, in Table 4, the story comes though less clearly for taxes on cigarettes. First,
unlike for the other four products, there is evidence of strategic interaction prior to 1993.
Specifically, for both model specifications and for both the specific component of the tax
and the total tax, there is evidence of significant strategic interaction prior to 1993.
Second, for the baseline model with a tax-specific structural break, there is evidence of
increased strategic interaction (i.e. a positive c) only for the total tax, whereas in the other
specification, the reverse is true. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that, as
discussed in the introduction, the problem of illegal smuggling is much more serious for
cigarettes and other tobacco products than it is for the other products.
4. Robustness Checks
4.1. No Country Characteristics
In the general structural break model, there is a potential problem of overfitting: six
parameters are estimated on just 60 observations. This manifests itself in two ways. First,
the coefficients on the control variables vary noticeably across the two sub-periods.
Moreover, the controls are jointly insignificant in the case of still and sparkling wine in
the first sub-period. As a robustness check, therefore, we estimate the general structural
break model without controls i.e. just with country fixed effects. The results are
reported in Table 5.
This Table shows that our main results on strategic interaction are generally robust to
the omission of the controls. That is, same pattern of coefficients on si emerges, with
one exception. This is that there is now evidence of strategic interaction in the beer
excise prior to 1993, with the reaction function slope actually being larger prior to 1993
than afterwards. However, in the case of beer, the controls are jointly significant prior
to 1993, and so omission of the controls may lead to bias, and thus perhaps not too
much weight should be placed on this.
4.2. Alternative Weighting Schemes
So far, we have weighted other countries taxes using contiguity weights. Given the
nature of commodity tax competition, these seem to be clearly the appropriate weights.
However, we conduct several robustness checks to see if they indeed do work better
than other weighting schemes. In Table 6, only the reaction function slope coefficients
are reported, although controls and fixed effects are included in all regressions.
What do we expect to find with other weights? Suppose that the data are really being
generated by a process of tax competition between geographical neighbours after 1993
only. Then, we expect other weights to show weaker evidence of strategic interaction
and this evidence should be poorer, the more different the other weights are from
contiguity weights. This is broadly what we do find.
First, we look at modified contiguity weights, or triangulation weights, generated by
Delauney triangulation.23 This works as follows. Each country is identified by a point in
23 Kelley Pace has written the code (FDELW2.m) to convert Delauney algorithm results into a contiguity
matrix. The code is included in his Spatial Statistics toolbox 2.0 for Matlab, which can be downloaded from
www.spatial-statistics.com.
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the plane (i.e. R2) given by the longitude and latitude coordinates of the capital. These
points are then joined in such a way that all of the space is subdivided in triangles. Now
if a country i shares an edge with country j, then the two countries are contiguous and
in the weight matrix xij ¼ 1, otherwise xij ¼ 0. There are two different versions of this
weight matrix, the first being symmetric and the second being row-normalised. These
weights have the advantage that they deal systematically, rather than in an ad hoc way,
with countries that are islands or separated by sea from other countries, of which there
are quite a few in our sample.
As the triangulation weights are positively, although not perfectly, correlated with
our baseline contiguity weights, we would expect the regressions with triangulation
weights to still show evidence of strategic interaction after 1993 but less clearly than
with contiguity weights.24 This is more or less what we see in Table 6. Looking first at
Table 5
All Taxes – No Country Controls
Still Wine Sparkling Wine
1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004
si 0.661 0.684*** 0.142 1.009***
(1.235) (0.216) (0.936) (0.204)
Anderson 8.970 18.136 8.115 35.276
(0.030) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000)
Hansen 1.661 0.022 3.391 0.041
(0.436) (0.989) (0.184) (0.980)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Beer Ethyl Alcohol
si 0.725*** 0.715*** 0.241 1.194***
(0.237) (0.243) (0.563) (0.253)
Anderson 19.234 32.952 20.993 38.250
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen 3.490 5.936 4.389 2.349
(0.322) (0.115) (0.111) (0.309)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Cigarettes specific Cigarettes total
si 0.556*** 1.056*** 1.071*** 0.986***
(0.118) (0.160) (0.082) (0.062)
Anderson 14.329 36.945 19.514 38.301
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Hansen 2.154 1.991 4.868 2.147
(0.541) (0.574) (0.182) (0.542)
Str. break Reject H0 Reject H0
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as:
F(1,47) for 1987–92, F(1,131) for 1993–2004 and F(2,190) for 1987–2004.
Str. break: H0 ¼ no structural break.
24 For example, in our baseline weighting scheme, Greece only has Italy as a neighbour but, in the
triangulation scheme, it also has Spain, Portugal, Germany and Denmark.
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the tax-specific structural break model, i.e. comparing columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 to
the relevant columns of Tables 2–4 we see that this is what happens.25
Finally, we compare contiguity weights to placebo weights which are chosen in some
random way without regard to any economic considerations. Following Case et al.
(1992), we construct a weighting matrix based on a nonsense procedure; xij > 0 only
if the name of country j comes after country i in the alphabet.26 If we continue to find
evidence of strategic interaction with these placebo weights after 1993, that might
Table 6
Estimates With Other Weighting Schemes
Wdis1 Wdis2 Wrand
1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004 1987–92 1993–2004
Still wine
si 0.036 1.088 1.705*** 0.013 1.256 1.655*** 0.194 0.099 0.176
(0.476) (1.088) (0.537) (0.560) (1.211) (0.509) (0.172) (0.224) (0.137)
D  si 0.256*** 0.195** 0.068
(0.083) (0.098) (0.051)
Sparkling Wine
si 0.384 1.248 1.565***0.072 0.349 1.452*** 0.030 0.053 0.019
(0.412) (0.823) (0.437) (0.411) (1.625) (0.337) (0.198) (0.304) (0.169)
D  si 0.115* 0.153** 0.053
(0.069) (0.070) 0.059)
Beer
si 1.433*** 1.617*** 1.661*** 1.253*** 1.415*** 1.465*** 0.109 0.743** 0.062
(0.251) (0.559) (0.457) (0.287) (0.524) (0.391) (0.132) (0.302) (0.119)
D  si 0.009 0.003 0.050
(0.058) (0.064) (0.042)
Ethyl Alcohol
si 0.249 0.969 1.144*** 0.516** 1.170 1.197***118.027 468.042*** 25.795
(0.268) (0.626) (0.290) (0.246) (0.745) (0.285) (72.521) (170.743) (72.316)
D  si 0.142** 0.092 105.536***
(0.069) (0.075) (27.121)
Cigarettes specific
si 0.009 0.902*** 1.958*** 1.312*** 0.679** 1.718*** 1.692*** 0.423** 0.366***
(0.389) (0.312) (0.354) (0.277) (0.308) (0.288) (0.560) (0.184) (0.102)
D  si 0.361* 0.040 0.285
(0.190) (0.132) (0.183)
Cigarettes total
si 1.379*** 0.885*** 1.726*** 0.643*** 1.036*** 1.537*** 0.083 0.027 0.022
(0.197) (0.184) (0.211) (0.226) (0.196) (0.188) (0.108) (0.192) (0.044)
D  si0.036 0.126** 0.045
(0.034) (0.055) (0.028)
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as:
F(6,42) for 1987–92, F(6,126) for 1993–2004 and F(7,185) for 1987–2004.
Str. break: H0 ¼ no structural break.
25 Specifically, for the first triangulation weights, the main changes are as follows. Strategic interaction in
sparkling wine excises is now only significant at 10% after 1993. There is now evidence of strategic interaction
in beer excises before 1993 which does not intensify after 1993. There is now no evidence of strategic inter-
action in specific cigarette excises before 1993 but some evidence (a positive coefficient significant at 10%) of
interaction after 1993. Competition in the total tax on cigarettes does not seem to intensify after 1993. A
similar comparison can be made for the second triangulation weight.
26 The weights are also row-normalised in this case.
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indicate some general positive correlation between all excise taxes generated by
omitted common shocks, which would cast doubt on our claim that we have found
evidence of tax competition.
Happily, we see from Table 6 that placebo weights do not show any evidence of
positive strategic interaction after 1993, with the exception of specific excises on
cigarettes. Looking across commodities and across the two sub-samples, there does not
seem to be any pattern in the reaction function slope coefficients at all; most of them
are insignificant.
4.3. Minimum Tax Rates
So far in the analysis, we have ignored any possible effects of minimum tax rates. Evers
et al. (2004), based on the theoretical literature, argue that such rates, if they affect the
Nash equilibrium at all, will generally cause rates to rise. For example, in Nielsen’s
(2001) model, it is easily verified in the two-country case that if the minimum tax is
binding on the lower-tax country, it will raise the tax not only in that country but also in
the other, high-tax country, as the latter country is moved along its upward-sloping tax
reaction function. So, we should expect, other things equal, the minimum tax to
increase the intercepts of the reaction functions.
It is less clear how the minimum tax will affect the amount of strategic interaction.
Here, we simply follow Evers et al. (2004) by interacting the minimum tax with the
weighted average of other countries taxes. So, given that minimum taxes did not come
in force until 1993, we estimate, over the period 1993–2004, an augmented version of
(2) i.e.
sit ¼ fi þ bsi;t þ d0zit þ hmt þ c mt  si;t
 þ it ð5Þ
where mt is the minimum tax at time t and si,t ¼
P
j 6¼ixijsjt. We expect h > 0 and
possibly c 6¼ 0. But there are some complications.
First, for wine (still and sparkling) the minimum tax rate is zero, so (5) cannot be
estimated for these products. Second, for cigarettes, the minimum tax rate (measured
as a percentage of the retail price) has been unchanged since 1993, at 57%. So, as the
minimum tax rate mt is not time-varying in this case, h, c cannot be identified from
regression (5) just over the period 1993–2004.
For beer the minimum tax rate has been unchanged since 1993, and it is equal to
0.7448 euro per hl/degree Plato or 1.87 euro per hl/degree of alcohol of finished
product. So, in real terms, mt is declining and this allows us to estimate (5) in this case.
The first column of Table 7 reports the estimation of (5) for beer, using a contiguity
weight matrix, and instrumenting both si,t and mt  si,t by weighted averages of the
control variables in countries j 6¼ i. The only tax-related variable that is significant is
mt  si,t with a positive coefficient.
For ethyl alcohol, the picture is similar to beer; the minimum tax rate has been
unchanged since 1993 at 500 euro per hl of pure alcohol, is thus declining in real
terms, again allowing us to estimate (5). In this case, no tax variables are significant.
Given that there are only 204 observations available, perhaps it is asking too much of
the data to estimate b, h and c precisely.
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5. Conclusions
In this work we analysed the effects of the tax competition after the introduction of the
Single Market in EU in 1993. Using a panel data set of 12 EU countries over a period of
17 years from 1987 to 2004 and a spatial econometrics approach, we tested for the
presence of strategic interaction among neighbouring countries in the setting of five
excise taxes. Our work differs most other empirical studies in the same area, as we use
actual tax rates as dependent variables and not some derived tax ratio.
Our main finding is a structural break after 1993, indicating that the introduction of
the Single Market has modified tax setting among the EU countries. Specifically, for
taxes on still and sparkling wine, beer and ethyl alcohol, we can reject the null
hypothesis that the slope of the tax reaction function was the same before and after
1993. For these taxes, the reaction function slope is always significantly positive post-
1993, and never before 1993. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the Single
Market created competition between countries in these taxes where there was none
before, by making tax bases internationally mobile.
In the case of cigarettes, the findings are somewhat different; the reaction function
slope is significantly positive before 1993 but, if the total tax is used, this slope does
appear to increase after 1993. This can be explained by the fact that significant
smuggling in cigarettes creates incentives for tax competition even if legal transactions

























Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis
under the coefficient estimates.
F-test for joint significance of controls is distributed as: F(8, 184).
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Fig. A.1. Still Wine – Specific Excise in National Currency
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Fig. A.2. Sparkling Wine – Specific Excise in National Currency
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Fig. A.3. Beer – Specific Excise in National Currency
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Fig. A.4. Ethyl Alcohol – Specific Excise in National Currency
426 [ M A R C HT H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L



































































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Cigarettes UK
Fig. A.5. Cigarettes – Specific Excise in National Currency
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Fig. A.6. Cigarettes – Total Tax-% Retail Price
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